Online Scams and ASEAN-China Trust
Online scam networks are a multi-billion dollar problem for ASEAN. The problem is a test for ASEAN institutions and a test of trust with China.

Online scam networks are a multi-billion dollar problem for ASEAN, and a test for both its institutions and its relationship with China. This was underlined when the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, delivered remarks at the International Conference on Combating Online Scams in Phnom Penh on September 23, as reported by ASEAN.org. The conference brings attention to a dark side of regional integration: the use of ASEAN territory by transnational criminal groups, often with Chinese nationals as ringleaders and victims, to operate industrial-scale scam operations.
Institutions and Trust
The scale of these scam centers, particularly in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, has become a source of significant friction. These operations rely on a steady flow of trafficked labor from across the region, including from as far as China, to run scripts that defraud victims globally. The business model is sophisticated. It leverages weak governance in border zones, the availability of internet infrastructure, and the ease of moving money through unregulated crypto channels. This criminal ecosystem has grown to a scale that now impacts the legitimate technology sectors in these countries and erodes trust, both among citizens and between governments.
The institutional response from ASEAN has been slow to form. While the problem has been festering for years, collaborative law enforcement efforts are now beginning to take shape. The conference in Phnom Penh is one such step. However, the core of the problem lies in execution. National police forces and judiciaries in the affected states often lack the resources, and sometimes the political will, to dismantle deeply entrenched criminal networks that may have ties to local power brokers. This is not just a domestic crime issue; it is a transnational problem that tests the limits of ASEAN's consensus-based approach to security cooperation.
The China Dimension
China's role is central. Chinese authorities are applying increasing pressure on ASEAN governments to crack down on these scam operations, which disproportionately target Chinese citizens. Beijing's response has been a mix of public security cooperation and direct unilateral action, including issuing arrest warrants for ringleaders based in Myanmar. This creates a delicate dynamic for ASEAN member states. They must demonstrate a credible effort to combat the problem to maintain good relations with their largest trading partner, while also asserting their own sovereignty over law enforcement matters.
This is a specific, operational challenge that fits within a broader strategic context. As detailed in the book "ASEAN Rising", the depth of the bloc's economic integration with China is a structural reality. For ASEAN governments, the issue is "how to manage dependency without losing optionality." In the case of scam centers, this means managing the security dependency on China's cooperation to solve a problem that is partly of Chinese origin, without ceding control over domestic security policy. A failure to manage this specific criminal issue could erode the political trust needed to manage the much larger economic relationship.
Capital and Talent
The scam industry also represents a perversion of regional capital flows and talent mobility. The initial capital for setting up these compounds often originates from illicit sources in China and elsewhere. It flows into the gray zones of the ASEAN economy, corrupting local officials and distorting property markets in towns like Sihanoukville in Cambodia or Myawaddy in Myanmar. The promise of high-paying tech jobs is used as a lure to traffic thousands of educated young people from across the region, from Indonesia to Vietnam. Instead of contributing to a growing digital economy, this talent is captured by criminal enterprises, leading to a tragic loss of human capital.
Addressing this requires more than just police raids. It demands a coordinated effort to tighten financial regulations and monitor the digital infrastructure that enables these scams. It also requires providing viable economic alternatives in the border regions where these scam centers thrive. For ASEAN, the challenge is to ensure that the infrastructure and capital connecting the region are used for legitimate commerce, not transnational crime. The scam industry is a parasitic element that threatens to undermine the foundations of the ASEAN Economic Community by turning the tools of integration into instruments of fraud.
What to watch: Observers should monitor whether the conference in Phnom Penh leads to sustained, coordinated law enforcement actions across multiple ASEAN countries, particularly in border areas. The level of Chinese involvement and satisfaction with these efforts will be a key indicator of the health of the broader ASEAN-China relationship. Pay attention to repatriation figures for trafficked workers and the number of senior-level arrests, which will signal whether the crackdown is superficial or substantive.


